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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Peggy Hassell, on behalf of herself and her deceased 
husband’s estate, appeals an order of the District Court dis-
missing her civil suit against The Budd Company and Resco 
Holdings LLC. Hassell asserted state law causes of action 
arising from her husband’s exposure to asbestos during the 
forty years he worked for the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 
Railway (the Railroad). Budd and Resco moved to dismiss, 
arguing that Hassell’s claims were preempted by the Locomo-
tive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq., and the Safety 
Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq. The District Court 
granted the companies’ motion, holding that Hassell’s claims 
were preempted by the Locomotive Inspection Act. 
 In this appeal, Hassell claims that the District Court 
erred procedurally by dismissing her complaint based on facts 
that were neither in her complaint nor undisputed. Hassell al-
so contends that the District Court misapplied the preemptive 
scope of the Locomotive Inspection Act to hold her claims 
preempted. Because we agree with Hassell’s procedural ar-
gument, we will vacate the Court’s order and remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I 
 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the rapid 
growth of the railroad industry in the United States brought 
with it numerous accidents and deaths. See, e.g., Charles W. 
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McDonald, Federal Railroad Administration, The Federal 
Railroad Safety Program 2–6 (Aug. 1993). In response to 
these safety concerns and because of the variety of state laws 
regulating the industry, Congress in 1893 passed the Safety 
Appliance Act (SAA). Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 
531–32, amended by Act of Mar. 2, 1903, ch. 976, 32 Stat. 
943, and Act of Apr. 14, 1910, ch. 160, 36 Stat. 298; see also 
Lorenzo S. Coffin, Safety Appliances on the Railroads, 5 An-
nals of Iowa 561, 569–80 (1903). Full implementation of the 
SAA, which required railroads to equip trains with automatic 
couplers and power brakes, was delayed until 1900. See Note, 
The Federal Safety Appliance Act as a Regulation of Inter-
state Commerce, 3 Mich. L. Rev. 387, 388 (1905). Eleven 
years later, Congress began regulating locomotive steam boil-
ers through the Boiler Inspection Act (BIA). Act of Feb. 17, 
1911, ch. 103, § 2, 36 Stat. 913–14. Soon thereafter, the BIA 
was amended to cover the entire locomotive as well as its 
“parts and appurtenances.” Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 169, 38 
Stat. 1192. The statute as amended has since been known as 
the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, or simply the Locomo-
tive Inspection Act (LIA).1  
 The increased federal regulation of the locomotive in-
dustry resulted in conflicts with various state laws. Accord-
ingly, in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 272 U.S. 
605 (1926), the Supreme Court was presented with constitu-
                                              
 1 The current version of the LIA is codified at 49 
U.S.C. § 20701 and provides in relevant part that “[a] railroad 
carrier may use . . . a locomotive or tender on its railroad line 
only when the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurte-
nances . . . are in proper condition and safe to operate without 
unnecessary danger of personal injury.”  
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tional challenges to laws in Georgia and Wisconsin that re-
quired the Court to decide whether Congress intended “to oc-
cupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment.” Id. 
at 611. The Court noted that the SAA, which included specif-
ic requirements, and the BIA, which regulated only boilers, 
did not preempt the field. Id. As amended in 1915, however, 
the LIA included a “general” power that “extend[ed] to the 
design, the construction, and the material of every part of the 
locomotive and tender and of all appurtenances.” 272 U.S. at 
611. The “broad scope” of this “general” authority led the 
Court to conclude that Congress, in enacting the LIA, had 
“occupied the field of regulating locomotive equipment.” Id. 
at 607, 613. For that reason, “[b]ecause the standard set by 
the [Interstate Commerce] Commission must prevail, re-
quirements by the states are precluded, however commenda-
ble or different their purpose.” Id. at 613.2  
 Almost a century later, the Supreme Court revisited the 
LIA’s preemptive scope in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Prod-
ucts Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012). Unlike Napier—which 
involved the preemption of state statutes—Kurns considered 
whether the LIA preempted state causes of action. The plain-
tiffs in Kurns asserted state law defective-design and failure-
                                              
 2 The administration and enforcement of the LIA was 
originally entrusted to the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 
1261, 1266 & n.3 (2012). Since 1967, this authority has been 
vested in the Federal Railroad Administration under the direc-
tion of the Secretary of Transportation. See id.; see also, e.g., 
49 U.S.C. 103(g); Federal Railroad Administration, Inspec-
tion and Maintenance Standards for Steam Locomotives, 64 
Fed. Reg. 62,828, 62,828 (Nov. 17, 1999). 
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to-warn claims against the manufacturers of locomotive brake 
shoes and locomotive engine valves that contained asbestos. 
132 S. Ct. at 1265. Underscoring that “Napier defined the 
field pre-empted by the LIA on the basis of the physical ele-
ments regulated,” the Court held that the state law claims 
were preempted because they were “directed at the equipment 
of locomotives.” 132 S. Ct. at 1269 (emphasis added); see al-
so id. at 1270 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“According to Napier, 
the scope of the agency’s power under the [LIA] determines 
the boundaries of the preempted field.”). The Court thus re-
jected the distinction between common law claims and posi-
tive law enacted through state legislation or regulation, hold-
ing that Napier’s “categorical conclusion admits of no excep-
tion for state common-law duties and standards of care . . . 
[because] state ‘regulation can be . . . effectively exerted 
through an award of damages.’” Id. at 1269 (quoting San Di-
ego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 
(1959)). And by holding the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims 
preempted, the Court also precluded the attachment of state 
law duties or conditions to locomotive equipment because 
such legal requirements would “inevitably influence a manu-
facturer’s choice whether to use that particular design.” Id. at 
1268 n.4. 
II 
 Having summarized the law of field preemption under 
the LIA, we turn to the parties’ dispute in this appeal. Has-
sell’s civil action against Budd and Resco was filed in Texas 
state court. The case was removed to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas and transferred 
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of a multidis-
trict litigation. Hassell then filed an amended complaint as-
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serting state law products liability claims based on the follow-
ing facts.  
 Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, Hassell’s husband 
Billie was employed as an electrician by the Railroad. Billie’s 
responsibilities included the maintenance and repair of pas-
senger railcars designed and manufactured by Budd’s and 
Resco’s predecessors in interest. Steam pipes running under-
neath those railcars were insulated with material containing 
asbestos, and he was exposed to asbestos contained in the 
dust produced during the maintenance and repair of the rail-
cars. As a consequence of this exposure, Billie contracted as-
bestosis and mesothelioma. He died on May 30, 2009, during 
the pendency of this lawsuit.  
 Budd, joined by Resco, moved the District Court to 
dismiss Hassell’s amended complaint, arguing that her state 
law claims were preempted by the LIA, the SAA, and the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et 
seq. The District Court denied the motion without prejudice 
in light of our intervening opinion in Kurns v. A.W. Chester-
ton Inc. (Kurns I), 620 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2010), and the Su-
preme Court’s decision to grant a petition for writ of certiora-
ri to hear that case. See 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011). By this point 
in the proceedings, the parties had already completed substan-
tial discovery.  
 In February 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed our 
judgment in Kurns I and Budd renewed its motion to dismiss 
(which Resco again joined). See Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264. In 
the company’s renewed motion—which it “[a]lternatively” 
styled as a motion for summary judgment, App. 37a—Budd 
observed that the Supreme Court in Kurns had reaffirmed the 
scope of LIA preemption as defined in Napier and argued that 
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the LIA preempted Hassell’s claims because the asbestos-
insulated steam pipes on the passenger railcars qualified as 
locomotive “parts and appurtenances” under the statute. 49 
U.S.C. § 20701. Budd claimed that the “pipes were connected 
to the locomotive, which supplied heat from the locomotive’s 
engine to the pipes,” and that “[t]his kind of interconnected 
system qualifies as an appurtenance of the locomotive.” App. 
49a. Hassell countered that Budd had produced no evidence 
to support the company’s factual allegations, and that, in any 
event, she had produced evidence that the Railroad had used 
“power cars” to heat passenger compartments,3 such that the 
passenger railcars “would not even have [had] a metaphysical 
connection to a locomotive.” App. 85a. Hassell’s argument 
therefore distinguished between “locomotive appurte-
nances”—to which she conceded LIA preemption applied—
and non-locomotive equipment on passenger railcars, which 
she contended did not raise preemption concerns. See App. 
79a.  
 After hearing argument from the parties, the District 
Court granted Budd’s renewed motion to dismiss Hassell’s 
amended complaint. In doing so, the Court began by constru-
ing “parts and appurtenances” under the LIA based on South-
ern Railway Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 399 (1936). In Luns-
ford, the Supreme Court defined “parts and appurtenances” 
under the LIA as encompassing “[w]hatever in fact is an inte-
gral or essential part of a completed locomotive, and all parts 
or attachments definitely prescribed by lawful order of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.” Id. at 402. Noting that it 
                                              
 3 A “power car” was equipped with a “portable boiler 
that generated steam for many purposes including the heating 
of passenger coaches on trains.” App. 177a. 
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had previously found railcar brake shoes to constitute “parts 
and appurtenances” under the LIA because “they [were] part 
of the interconnected locomotive braking system” in Perry v. 
A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 669, 675 (E.D. Pa. 
2013), the District Court found that the pipes responsible for 
Billie’s asbestos exposure formed a “system of pipes that 
connect the railcars and locomotives, which are an essential 
and integral part of the completed locomotive.” App. 7a. Ac-
cordingly, the District Court held that Hassell’s claims were 
preempted under the LIA. Hassell filed this appeal.4 
III 
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate Hassell’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) be-
                                              
 4 Prior to granting Budd’s renewed motion to dismiss, 
the District Court denied Hassell’s motion for leave to file a 
second amended complaint in which she sought to plead state 
law claims alleging violations of federal standards of care 
contained in the LIA and the SAA. The District Court found 
that such amendments would have been futile because a vio-
lation of these statutes triggers strict liability under the Feder-
al Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., 
FELA claims can be asserted only by railroad employees 
against their employers (not manufacturers like Budd and 
Resco), and neither the LIA nor the SAA provides a remedy 
for a violation of their respective statutory requirements. See, 
e.g., Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Knoedler Mfrs., Inc., 781 F.3d 
656, 663 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 
163, 188–89 (1949)). Hassell has challenged this ruling on 




cause Hassel is a citizen of Texas, Budd and Resco are incor-
porated and have their principal places of business in states 
other than Texas, and the amount in controversy exceeds 
$75,000. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85, 92 
(2010); Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 
347 (3d Cir. 2013). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of Has-
sell’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(6) is plenary. See, e.g., Great W. Mining & Miner-
al Co. v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 
2010). In reviewing whether Hassell stated a viable claim, we 
must accept as true all plausible facts alleged in her amended 
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. 
See, e.g., Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2015). We review the District Court’s formula-
tion and application of the test defining the scope of the LIA’s 
field preemption de novo. See, e.g., Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 
854, 865 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. 
Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
IV 
A  
 Napier and Kurns establish that field preemption under 
the LIA turns on one fundamental question: is the state regu-
lation or cause of action “directed at the equipment of loco-
motives”? Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1268. If it is, the regulation or 
cause of action is preempted because it falls within the regu-
latory space assigned by the statute to the Federal Railroad 
Administration. See Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1269; see also, e.g., 
Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Knoedler Mfrs., Inc., 781 F.3d 656, 
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659 n.2, 661–62 (3d Cir. 2015); Oglesby v. Del. & Hudson 
Ry. Co., 180 F.3d 458, 460 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Un-
ion Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (CPUC), 346 
F.3d 851, 869 (9th Cir. 2003); Springston v. Consol. Rail 
Corp., 130 F.3d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1997); Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. 
v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. (MOPAC), 833 F.2d 570, 576 & n.7 
(5th Cir. 1987); Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 720 F.2d 
1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1983).  
 Neither Napier nor Kurns had to determine precisely 
which mechanical components of a train qualify as the 
“equipment of locomotives” because the answer was obvious 
in both cases. At issue in Napier were state statutes requiring 
railroads to install cab curtains and automatic doors in loco-
motives. 272 U.S. at 208. Kurns involved the imposition of 
state standards of care regarding locomotive brake shoes and 
engine valves. 132 S. Ct. at 1264. Thus, neither case had to 
confront the distinction between locomotive equipment and 
equipment belonging to some other railroad apparatus—in 
this case, passenger railcars. Nor are we aware of any other 
federal court of appeals’ decision that has had to squarely 
confront this distinction. 
 In the absence of clear guidance on the issue—and 
perhaps justified by a comment we made in Kurns I, 620 F.3d 
at 396 n.5— the District Court relied on Lunsford, in which 
the Supreme Court construed the term “parts and appurte-
nances” under the LIA to encompass “[w]hatever in fact is an 
integral and essential part of a completed locomotive, and all 
parts or attachments definitely prescribed by lawful order of 
the [Federal Railroad Administration].” 297 U.S. at 402. Alt-
hough Lunsford is not a case about preemption, see note 5, 
infra, the implicit logical chain between Napier and Lunsford 
inferred by the District Court is clear. The authority delegated 
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by the LIA permits the Federal Railroad Administration to 
regulate “the locomotive . . . and its parts and appurtenances,” 
49 U.S.C. § 20701, and those “parts and appurtenances” in-
clude anything that is “integral and essential” to the “com-
pleted locomotive,” Lunsford, 297 U.S. at 402. Therefore, be-
cause the scope of regulatory authority delegated by the LIA 
is coextensive with the scope of field preemption under the 
statute, the District Court reasoned that any state regulation of 
an “integral or essential” locomotive component is preempt-
ed. See Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1268–69; see also Napier, 272 
U.S. at 611–13.5 
                                              
 5 In light of our holding that the District Court erred 
procedurally, we express no opinion as to whether Lunsford 
appropriately defines the scope of field preemption under the 
LIA as set forth in Napier and Kurns—Lunsford simply es-
tablishes the legal backdrop applied by the District Court to 
determine the materiality of facts underlying Budd’s preemp-
tion defense. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986) (“Substantive law will identify which facts 
are material.”). We note, however, that two of our sister 
courts have declined to embrace Lunsford in the context of 
LIA preemption. See MOPAC, 833 F.2d at 576 & n.7 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (“Contrary to the Commission's assertion, [Luns-
ford] does not stand for the proposition that under the Loco-
motive Boiler Inspection Act state attempts to regulate are 
preempted only to the extent they prescribe ‘integral or essen-
tial’ equipment of a complete locomotive.”); Marshall, 720 
F.2d at 1152 (“The ordinary duty of care described 
in Lunsford does not apply in these circumstances, and Luns-
ford in no way affects our holding that the [LIA] preempts 




 As a necessary predicate to its conclusion that the as-
bestos-insulated pipes on the passenger railcars manufactured 
by Budd and Resco were “integral and essential” to a locomo-
tive, the District Court found that the pipes were joined to 
create a “system of pipes that connect the railcars and loco-
motives,” and that this system was “an essential and integral 
part of the completed locomotive” under Lunsford. App. 7a. 
These conclusions cannot be squared with Hassell’s amended 
complaint, however, devoid as it is of any facts establishing a 
“system of pipes” connecting the railcars to the locomotive. 
As Hassell observes, the word “locomotive” never even ap-
pears in her amended complaint.6 Thus, the District Court 
                                                                                                     
Circuit observed in MOPAC, the Supreme Court in Lunsford 
was not confronted with a question of preemption. See 833 
F.2d at 576 & n.7. Instead, the issue before the Court was 
how to define the scope of absolute liability under FELA for 
alleged violations of the LIA’s duty of care. 297 U.S. at 399–
400.  
 6 The amended complaint’s silence on this “system of 
pipes” or whether the railcar pipes were ever connected in 
some fashion to a locomotive—i.e., the facts assertedly giving 
rise to preemption—is unsurprising because federal preemp-
tion is an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears 
the burden of proof. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Leslie’s Pool Mart, 
Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 256 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1999). This allocation 
of the burden of proof suggests that a motion under Rule 
12(c) for judgment on the pleadings is a more appropriate 
procedural vehicle for dismissing cases on preemption 
grounds, instead of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), except for 
cases in which preemption is manifest in the complaint itself. 
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necessarily relied on evidence extrinsic to her pleadings to 
grant Budd’s motion. 
 This was error because “a court considering a motion 
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) may consider only the allegations contained in the 
pleading to determine its sufficiency.”7 Santomenno ex rel. 
John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 
                                                                                                     
See, e.g., Klayman v.  Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transport Corp. of 
Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2012); Fisher v. Halli-
burton, 667 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2012). In deciding a mo-
tion under Rule 12(c), the court must “view the facts present-
ed in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” and may 
not grant the motion “unless the movant clearly establishes 
that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that 
he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Jablonski v. 
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290–91 (3d Cir. 
1988) (quoting Soc’y Hill Civic Ass’n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 
1045, 1054 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 7 Although phrased in relatively strict terms, we have 
declined to interpret this rule narrowly. In deciding motions 
under Rule 12(b)(6), courts may consider “document[s] inte-
gral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,” In re Bur-
lington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 
1997) (emphasis in original), or any “undisputedly authentic 
document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion 
to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the docu-
ment,” PBGC v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
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768 F.3d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (citing 
Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 
(3d Cir. 2002)). And while district courts are not required to 
accept merely conclusory factual allegations or legal asser-
tions, see, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 
(2009), they still must accept as true all plausible factual alle-
gations made in the complaint and draw all reasonable infer-
ences in the plaintiff’s favor, see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 
765 F.3d 306, 323 (3d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the District 
Court’s reliance on facts alleged outside of Hassell’s amend-
ed complaint constitutes a procedural error under Rule 
12(b)(6).8 
                                              
 8 Budd contends that Hassell waived her procedural 
objection by urging the District Court to rule on Budd’s mo-
tion to dismiss, but we disagree. “[W]aiver is the ‘intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Tri-M 
Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 432 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Hardiman, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). In her brief opposing dismissal, 
Hassell characterized Budd’s motion as posing “questions of 
law” in which the underlying “facts [were] not in dispute.” 
App. 77a. By arguing to the District Court that Budd’s motion 
was ripe for disposition, Hassell could have waived the argu-
ment that the District Court should not have ruled on the mo-
tion, but she did not waive the argument that the District 
Court was bound by the procedural limits of Rule 12(b)(6), 
nor was this argument forfeited for the purposes of appeal. 
See id. (defining forfeiture as the “failure to make the timely 
assertion of a right”).  
16 
 
 That said, the District Court’s consideration of evi-
dence extrinsic to the complaint does not automatically re-
quire reversal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides 
that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judg-
ment under Rule 56.” See Messer v. V.I. Urban Renewal Bd., 
623 F.2d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[W]here matters outside 
the pleadings are considered by the district court, a motion 
under [Rule 12(b)(6)] for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted will be treated as a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment.”); see also 5B Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. 
2015).9 Although Rule 12(d) requires that the parties be given 
“reasonable notice,” the failure to give notice may be excused 
as harmless error in the absence of prejudice to the nonmov-
ing party. See, e.g., SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort, Inc., 
707 F.3d 267, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Ford Motor 
                                              
 9 Where, as here, a district court expressly disclaims 
the use of extrinsic evidence in deciding a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6), we have held that “our review is as under a motion 
to dismiss, even where additional materials were admitted in-
to the record.” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1562 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Adherence to Kulwicki, however, is “procrustean” 
when it is clear that the district court nonetheless considered 
“matters outside of the pleadings” to reach its disposition. 
Fagin v. Gilmartin, 432 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2005). And, 
although the district court in Kulwicki permitted the movants 
to file supplemental information, it chose not to consider 
those materials and properly considered the motion as one 
under Rule 12(b)(6). See 969 F.2d at 1462. 
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Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 284–85 (3d 
Cir. 1991)). 
 In this case, the District Court did not notify the parties 
that it was converting Budd’s motion to dismiss to a motion 
for summary judgment, but given that Budd alternatively pre-
sented its motion as one seeking summary judgment, it is un-
clear whether Hassell can demonstrate that she was unfairly 
prejudiced by the lack of notice. See In re Rockefeller Ctr. 
Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“Failure to provide notice is harmless error if the plaintiff’s 
complaint would not have survived a motion to dismiss.”); 
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 
judgment may be affirmed if it appears that there is no set of 
facts on which plaintiffs could possibly recover.”); see also 
Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 1995) (af-
firming summary judgment despite the district court’s failure 
to give notice because the disputed issue—“the exclusivity of 
the statutory definition of bioequivalence”—was purely legal 
in nature). However we might consider the prejudice issue, 
vacating the order dismissing Hassell’s complaint is still re-
quired because the District Court improperly applied the 
standard for summary judgment under Rule 56.  
18 
 
 In a typical formulation of the summary judgment 
standard, it   
is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery 
and disclosure materials on file, and any affida-
vits show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. In making this 
determination, we must view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
draw all inferences in that party’s favor. 
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quot-
ing Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Bassell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 91 
(3d Cir. 2008)). The movant bears the burden of establishing 
the undisputed facts and entitlement to judgment as a matter 
of law. See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 237 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
323 (1986)). 
 Viewed through this lens, summary judgment was not 
appropriate in this case for at least three reasons. First, neither 
Budd nor Resco produced any evidence supporting their as-
sertion that the railcar pipes responsible for Billie’s asbestos 
exposure formed an “interconnected system” with the loco-
motive. App. 50a. Budd’s first motion included exhibits in 
support of purely legal arguments concerning the scope of the 
LIA and the Federal Railroad Administration’s regulatory au-
thority, and its second motion was unaccompanied by any ex-
hibits; Resco’s joinder in these motions was similarly devoid 
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of evidentiary support.10 Thus, the companies failed to carry 
their burden of proof on the purportedly converted motion. 
Second, even assuming that evidence for the “interconnected 
system” could have been gleaned from the record, Hassell at-
tached in her opposition brief affidavit evidence from a for-
mer Railroad supervisor showing that, instead of being con-
nected to locomotives, the pipes were connected to “power 
cars” that separately supplied steam heat to the passenger 
coaches. She therefore established a genuine dispute of mate-
rial fact precluding summary judgment. See NAACP v. N. 
Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“After the movant shows that there is no genuine issue 
for trial, the non-moving party then bears the burden of iden-
tifying evidence that creates a genuine dispute regarding ma-
terial facts.”). Finally, the standard for summary judgment 
requires that factual inferences be drawn in the light most fa-
vorable to the nonmoving party. Although the facts before the 
District Court could have supported a reasonable inference 
that the pipes were connected to locomotives, summary 
                                              
 10 Budd argued in its second motion before the District 
Court that Hassell conceded the facts giving rise to the com-
pany’s preemption argument in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition 
notice filed by ACF Industries, L.L.C., a former codefendant 
that is not a party to this appeal. See App. 49a (citing ECF 
No. 28 in the District Court docket). This filing fails to sup-
port Budd’s contention as it was not even made by Hassell. 
Further, Budd’s insistence in the motion that Hassell did not 
dispute the company’s factual characterizations is misplaced 
because she was not required to contest Budd’s version of the 
facts necessary to support its preemption defense to establish 
the viability of her case. 
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judgment would have been improper because there were other 
facts of record supporting the contrary inference that the pipes 
were connected to something else. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility de-
terminations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing 
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not 
those of a judge. . . . The evidence of the non-movant is to be 
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 
favor.”); see also, e.g., United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 
811, 827 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, whether viewed from 
the perspective of Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, on the record as 
presented to us the District Court’s order cannot be af-
firmed.11 
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand Hassell’s case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
 11 We take no position as to whether summary judg-
ment might be warranted on a different record after further 
discovery. 
